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REJOINDER TO HASKER
Linda Zagzebski

In "Zagzebski on Power Entailment" William Hasker responds to the three
sets of counterexamples to Power Entailment Principles given in my book,
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. In this rejoinder I answer
Hasker's objections to the first two examples, and agree with him that the third
example is defective, although for a different reason than the one Hasker presents.

In my book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, I present three
types of counterexamples to the most well-known Power Entailment Principles. William Hasker has challenged all three, focusing on their application
to (PEP 1). Such a principle is threatening to most attempts to show divine
foreknowledge and human free will compatible according to which God is in
time and backwards causation is impossible. Since I defend theological compatibilism for the case in which God is in time as well as for the case in which
God is not in time, and since I do not attempt to defend backwards causation,
it is important for me to challenge this principle.
My first set of counterexamples is based on the idea that if any necessary
truths and their negations can be brought about by anybody while others can
be brought about by nobody, all of the proposed PEPs are false. As a suggestion for a proposition in the first category I propose (11) If there is a Fall,
God sends his Son to redeem the world. I suggest that (11) may be a necessary
truth, yet one chosen to be a necessary truth by God. To this Hasker objects
(1) that my example requires a non-standard view of modal logic, but I have
not given reason to think there is anything wrong with the standard view, and
(2) I operate within the standard theory for most of the book. In particular, I
accept three principles according to which my own counterexample fails. I
will respond to the first point first.
This counterexample rests on the idea that there are alternative complete
sets of possible worlds, so even though (11) is true in all possible worlds
(we'll suppose), it is not true in worlds which would have been possible had
there been a different set of possible worlds. This makes sense only if modal
structure itself could have been different. It requires making a distinction
within the class of the necessary between those propositions which are necessarily necessary and those which are not necessarily necessary. As I remark
in my book, this way of looking at modality requires a modal system weaker
than S4 (p. 112). Without commenting on the relative merits of stronger and
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weaker modal systems, Hasker says that in order for the view I propose to
be taken seriously, I must (1) elaborate in detail an alternative modal theory,
and (2) show that the standard theory is inconsistent or incoherent, and therefore the PEPs which presuppose this theory are inadmissible (p. 252).
But the degree to which the rejection of S4 is non-standard is questionable.
As noted in the book, Nathan Salmon and Hugh Chandler have both argued
on independent grounds that S4 must be rejected anyway.) As Hasker knows,
weaker modal systems exist, and there is no need for me to elaborate a new
one in detail. Nevertheless, I proposed a brief metaphysical argument that S4
must be rejected, which I will summarize.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is often interpreted in such a way that
a reason is required for the truth value of a proposition, but not for its modal
status. If some proposition is contingent, a reason is required for its truth, but
if a proposition is necessary, the fact that it is necessary is sufficient reason
for its being true. But why, we may ask, is some particular necessary proposition necessary? What explains its necessity? Modal theories as strong as S4
take the position that every necessary proposition is necessarily necessary,
and, indeed, necessarily necessarily necessary, and so on. But if the modal status
of a proposition is a fact, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason requires an
explanation for every fact, there must be an explanation of the fact that a proposition is necessary as well as for the fact that it is true. To claim that every
necessary proposition is necessarily necessary, then, cannot be such an explanation. The view Hasker supports, while a common one, takes the position
that there is nothing to be said outside of modal structure to explain why it
is what it is. It is this position that I am challenging.
Hasker is right that the stronger modal systems are more entrenched, and
I do not claim that they are demonstrably incoherent. What I do claim is that
anyone proposing the truth of one of the PEPs is relying on the background
assumption of a modal system at least as strong as S4. But not only are there
signs that these modal systems are under attack on technical grounds, I suggest there are metaphysical grounds for questioning them as well. Since
anyone proposing that a Power Entailment Principle is a universal truth has
the burden of proving this is the case, these considerations lead to the conclusion that PEP has not been demonstrated.
Hasker's second objection to the first counterexample rests on three principles which, he says, partially stipulate the meaning of "necessary proposition," "essential property," and "possible world," and which he believes to
be incompatible with my example:
i) A proposition is necessarily true if and only if it is true in all possible
worlds.
ii)

A property is essential to an individual if and only if the individual has
the property in every possible world in which the individual exists.
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iii) God, God's states, and God's attributes are included in the possible
worlds rather than outside them.

These principles are plausible standard modal principles and Hasker is right
that I use them myself. As stated, however, the principles appear to be noncommittal on the issue of whether there are alternative complete sets of
possible worlds. If they are interpreted in a way that permits alternative sets
of worlds, there is no incompatibility between my example and the principles.
On the other hand, if they are intended to rule out such alternatives, this needs
to be stated plainly in their formulation and defended. Hasker cannot rely on
the claim that it is part of the meaning of such terms as 'necessary proposition'
and 'possible world' that there is a unique set of possible worlds. To make
such a claim is to say that the weaker modal systems are mistaken about the
meaning of these terms. Hasker has not made such a claim, and I doubt that
he intends to do so.
Rather than to address the issue of alternative sets of worlds, Hasker misrepresents his own principle on essential properties. As he correctly points
out, it follows by principle (ii) that the property of decreeing that (11) is true
is one of God's essential properties. "But," says Hasker, "it's not in God's
power to shed one of his essential properties any more than it is in my power
to divest myself of my own essential properties." And so, he says, the example
fails. The question, though, is not whether God can shed one of his essential
properties, but whether one of God's essential properties is best explained as
the result of his choice, a choice which it is true to say he could have made
differently, even though it is also a choice which God makes in all possible
worlds-i.e., all worlds possible relative to the actual world. The idea that
God wills an essential property of his is not without precedent, and if it is
ruled out it cannot simply be on the basis of principles such as (i)-(iii), much
less on the basis of a stipulation of the meaning of modal concepts.
Hasker's final point about my first counterexample is that it will not help
in the case in which p is contingent. My second counterexample was devised
in anticipation of this objection. Suppose that A is something I can choose to
do or not to do, and that God decides to do B in all and only those worlds in
which I do A. If so, the propositions I do A and God does B would be strictly
equivalent, and their strict equivalence would be brought about by God, not
me. In this case, I claimed, I have the power to bring it about that I do A is
true, and I have the power to bring it about that I do A is false, I do A entails
God does B and It is not the case that I do A entails It is not the case that
God does B, yet I do not have the power to bring it about that God does B is
true. The truth of that proposition is brought about by God. We have, then, a
counter-example to (PEP 1).
In reply Hasker claims that in the case described I do bring about the truth
of God does B, and he thinks that I have misunderstood the sense of "bring
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about" intended in (PEP 1). He suggests that in my counterexample I make
the assumption that "bring about" means "consciously and intentionally bring
about," yet I make no such assumption and agree with Hasker that one can
bring about something without doing so consciously or intentionally. My reason
for saying that it is God who brings about the truth of God does B is simply that
God does all the work of bringing about the truth of that proposition.
To see why this is so, consider an analogy. Suppose that I decide that when
and only when Joe apologizes to Mary, I will build my house. Joe apologizes
to Mary and I build my house. Does Joe bring about the building of my house?
I control the house-building, both in its timing (I am the one who decided to
begin when Joe makes the apology), and in carrying out the entire project.
Joe no more brings about my house building than the moon does if I were to
decide to wait for a new moon. In the theistic case it is part of God's essence
that he does B if and only if I do A, and so we are back to the question of
the relation between God's will and his essence, but in any case it is God,
whether by his will or his essence, who brings about B, not I.
My third set of counterexamples proceeded from the assumption that there
are some true counterfactuals of freedom whose truth is brought about by the
human agents named in the counterfactuals. As an example I suggested If my
son asked me for an apple, I would not give him poison (A > - P). The idea
was to reduce counterfactuals to strict implications based on similarity of
worlds in roughly the manner discussed by David Lewis. If a counterfactual
of freedom is brought about by a human agent, its equivalent strict implication would be brought about by the human agent as well. Since clearly not
all necessary truths can be brought about by such an agent, we can formulate
a counterexample to PEPl.
I now believe that the attempt to reduce counterfactuals to strict implications will not work, but that is not the objection Hasker gives. Instead, his
response is to claim that there is a true strict implication of freedom which
has nothing to do with the agent's power corresponding to every false counterfactual of freedom as well as to every true one. Such a response suggests
that it was not clear in my book that my proposal was to find a strict implication equivalent to the counterfactual. But then, Hasker's move is not relevant if only because no necessarily true proposition can be equivalent to a
false one.
A better formulation of the intent of the third counterexample is as follows:
Take the counterfactual of freedom
(1) A > - P.

Necessarily, (1) is true in the actual world just in case
(2) There is at least one AI-P world more similar to the actual world than
any AlP world.
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As long as 'the actual world' names the world that is in fact the actual world
and the similarity relations among worlds are necessary, then (2) is a necessary truth. If it is reasonable to say that since by hypothesis I can bring about
(1), I can bring about (2), we have a counterexample to PEP! by substituting
(2) for p and 2+2=4 for q.
The claim that if I can bring about (1) I can bring about (2) would be
supported if (1) and (2) are equivalent. However, Edward Wierenga has led
me to doubt that (1) and (2) are equivalent and that the moral to be drawn is
that the statement of the truth conditions for some proposition p in the semantics may not be equivalent to p. Still, even in the absence of logical
equivalence it may nonetheless be the case that if I can bring about the truth
of a proposition, I can bring about the truth of the proposition expressing its
truth conditions. But I am now convinced that this will not work either. To
see why not, consider a simpler example. Suppose I can bring about the truth
of
(1) I drink a cup of tea at t.

(1) is true in the actual world just in case

(2) Proposition (1) is true in the actual world.

But I cannot bring about the truth of (2) since I do not have the power to
make the actual world the actual world. Therefore, the example fails, and I
withdraw my third counterexample to the PEPs.
I thank Bill Hasker for his comments and welcome further thoughts from
him and others on these examples.
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